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Widespread agreement exists that too many juveniles are being tried as 
adults. Agreement breaks down over what is to be done. Some propose 
abolition of adult court jurisdiction over juveniles; many others propose 
some combination of categorical limits on transferring juveniles to adult 
court. Still others propose abolishing juvenile court altogether and 
according juveniles special treatment within the adult system or replacing 
juvenile court with some sort of civil regime. 
Discussion of juvenile justice reform has been stimulated by the 
Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Roper v. Simmons1 and Miller v. 
Alabama.2  The Court’s abolition of the death penalty for juveniles and its 
requirement of some measure of individualized consideration for the 
imposition of life sentences without the possibility of parole have expanded 
the sense of what may be possible in the foreseeable future. 
The major obstacle to reform remains punitive attitudes about juvenile 
culpability that took root during a series of “moral panics” in the 1980s and 
1990s that remain deeply entrenched among many of the state legislators 
who hold it in their power to change juvenile court transfer policies.3  
Whatever the extent of the general softening in attitudes towards juveniles 
in society, many legislators remain afraid of being seen as soft on crime—a 
fear that is fortified each time a juvenile anywhere in this very populous 
society commits a heartless crime. 
At such a time, the challenge for legal scholarship is to strike the right 
balance between idealism and realism. Reforms predicated upon a 
completely enlightened polity are too idealistic to be useful.  Like the 
                                                                                                                 
 * Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. 
 1. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding that “[t]he Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when 
their crimes were committed”). 
 2. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012) (holding that mandatory sentences of life 
without the possibility of parole are unconstitutional for juvenile offenders). 
 3. STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS 9–10 (1972).  Stanley Cohen coined the 
term “moral panic” and was probably the first sociologist to study and analyze moral panics in a study of 
British “Mods” and “Rockers” published in 1972.  Id. 
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economist in the joke who is trapped on a desert island with only canned 
food, but no utensils, and tells his fellow survivors that they simply need to 
“assume a can opener,” reformers cannot simply assume the conditions 
necessary for their success.  Likewise, reforms that simply tinker at the 
edges of what currently seems politically feasible fail to make the most of 
the emerging change in attitudes.  Few would have predicted the emergence 
of Eighth Amendment limits on noncapital sentences for juveniles a few 
years ago.  What might be possible five years from now? 
The challenge, therefore, is to identify reforms that are sufficiently 
aspirational to be meaningful, but that are also sufficiently realistic to 
inspire political support today.  Such reforms would be designed for the 
second-best world in which we live; but ideally, they should, themselves, 
serve as stepping stones to an even better world that might become possible 
farther down the road—a world that might, conceivably, be brought about 
by future Supreme Court decisions. 
In this spirit, I propose a very different type of legislative reform for 
juvenile transfer: a legislatively created right to a jury trial on the issue of 
whether juveniles should be sentenced as juveniles or as adults.  Part I will 
briefly sketch the outlines of my proposal.4  Part II will describe the 
prevailing political constraints on juvenile justice reform by describing the 
most salient features of recent moral panics about crime, in general, and 
juvenile crime in particular.5  Part III will explain the advantages of my 
proposal in responding to these constraints and a few possible objections.6  
Part III will also briefly describe the ways in which such a practice might 
eventually lead to a constitutional right to such a jury trial at some point in 
the future.7 
I.  PART I 
Juveniles should enjoy a jury trial “right of last resort” on the issue of 
whether they should be sentenced as juveniles or adults.  This right would 
not preclude earlier determinations by judges or prosecutors as to whether 
the juvenile should be transferred to adult court in the first place, but those 
determinations notwithstanding, juveniles would still be allowed to demand 
a jury trial on the issue of whether they should be sentenced as adults or as 
juveniles.  The jury would not determine the sentence itself, but it would 
have the last word as to which sentencing regime—adult or juvenile—
would apply to the case at hand.  The jury would, in essence, be entrusted 
with what might best be described as a threshold sentencing decision, 
although not with sentencing itself.  Such a requirement would, in effect, 
                                                                                                                 
 4. See infra Part I. 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. See infra Part III. 
 7. See infra Part III. 
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function as a right of last resort for juveniles who have already been 
transferred to adult court for adjudication of guilt, but who wish to 
challenge the decision to sentence them as adults one final time. 
The most logical way for such a right to operate would be in a 
bifurcated trial where the same jury that heard evidence of guilt and 
innocence would also hear, in a separate phase, evidence as to whether adult 
or juvenile sentencing would be most appropriate.  Like the sentencing 
phase of a capital trial, the jury would hear evidence from both the 
prosecution and the defense that would, in effect, seek to aggravate or 
mitigate the sentence to be imposed. The criteria to be used for this 
threshold sentencing decision would be the same criteria currently used for 
transfer proceedings in the jurisdiction, with whatever modifications 
necessary to make the criteria more intelligible to laypersons.  Likewise, 
during this phase, the jury would be privy to all of the same information 
available to a judge at a transfer hearing, including the range of available 
sentencing options in both juvenile and adult court.8  For this reason, 
however, the threshold sentencing decision by the jury would have to 
follow, not precede, the guilt phase of the trial—lest the impartiality of the 
jury be compromised in favor of either guilt or innocence.  While all that 
the jury learned about the nature of the offense would be probative on the 
issue of sentencing, much of what the jury would learn during the 
sentencing phase would not be probative on guilt and might well be highly 
prejudicial on that issue.  A juvenile’s history of past abuse and neglect 
might arouse the sympathy of the jury and lead to an unjust acquittal.  
Similarly, a juvenile’s history of multiple or serious prior criminal offenses 
might arouse the jury’s hatred and fear and lead to an unjust conviction. 
Such a right would obviously impose an additional burden on the 
prosecution.  Proving guilt before a jury instead of a judge is more time 
consuming and possibly more difficult.  Even after the greater effort and the 
increased risk of an acquittal, a prosecution might, nonetheless, result in a 
juvenile court sentence.  As will be discussed at greater length in Part II, 
however, the greater burden is an appropriate safeguard to ensure that adult 
sentencing of juvenile offenders takes place only when appropriate.9 
Moreover, the juvenile could waive this jury right of last resort.  One 
could expect that prosecutors might charge or plea-bargain with a juvenile 
in order to receive such a waiver.  Allowing this right to be subject to the 
prevailing practices of charge and plea bargaining is probably necessary to 
make the proposal politically feasible, given the great volume of juvenile 
cases where transfer has become an issue.  For this reason, the right confers 
                                                                                                                 
 8. See Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: Comparing 
Severity and Variance with Judicial Sentences in Two States, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 331, 344 
(2005) (finding that in Virginia and Arkansas, sentences imposed during jury trials are typically stiffer 
for many offenses than sentences following either a guilty plea or bench trial). 
 9. See infra Part II. 
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additional leverage upon the juvenile in these negotiations.  This additional 
leverage, however, would be distributed in a proportionate and desirable 
way.  The greater the likelihood that—all things considered—a jury might 
convict a juvenile, yet only sentence him as a juvenile, the greater the 
pressure on the prosecutor to seek an agreement on a juvenile sentence in 
the first instance, or to insist only on an adult sentence that is truly 
proportionate to the offense and to the offender.  The shadow of the jury 
would constrain the power of the prosecutor in a useful way. 
Such a right might also influence judges in both good and bad ways.  
Judges who believe that a jury might ultimately reject adult court 
sentencing would have an incentive to save the judicial system the time and 
expense of a jury trial by keeping the case in juvenile court.  On the other 
hand, judges who wish to avoid politically difficult decisions about 
transfers might simply “kick the can” to the jury in order to avoid 
responsibility for the outcome.  Such can-kicking is also possible for 
prosecutors, but both prosecutors and judges would have good reason to 
kick only those cans that have a reasonable chance of being handled by the 
jury in a way favorable to their respective interests. 
One might expect, therefore, that the mere prospect of the jury making 
this threshold sentencing decision might decrease somewhat the power both 
judges and prosecutors have to sentence juveniles as adults.  Certainly, one 
might expect that fewer of the less serious property and drug offenses might 
be transferred.  As to the serious and violent offenses that have largely 
driven the trend toward adult court transfer, juries could be expected to 
refuse adult court sentencing only in those cases where truly compelling 
mitigating circumstances exist.  Whether limiting adult sentencing in such a 
way would be a good thing is the next question to be addressed. 
II.  PART II 
It is beyond the scope of this short essay to make the case that too 
many juveniles are sentenced as adults.  Numerous books and articles have 
made this argument at length and in depth.10  These works have also 
                                                                                                                 
 10. See, e.g., ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 1, 11 
(2008) (arguing, as others also have, that “[a]fter more than a decade of steadily declining juvenile crime 
rates,” punitive legal reforms should be mitigated with more rehabilitative interventions);  see also John 
D. Burrow, Punishing Serious Juvenile Offenders: A Case Study of Michigan’s Prosecutorial Waiver 
Statute, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 1, 41 (2005) (noting that “African-American juvenile offenders 
were disproportionately waived to adult court”); Sarah M. Greathouse et al., The Potentially Biasing 
Effects of Voir Dire in Juvenile Waiver Cases, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 427, 427 (2011) (noting that in 
the past twenty years, “concern with crime-control resulted in a growing number of laws designed to 
adjudicate juvenile offenses within the adult criminal justice system”); Elizabeth S. Scott, “Children are 
Different:” Constitutional Values and Justice Policy, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2013) 
(manuscript at 27–30), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2191711 (arguing that too many juveniles 
were tried as adults in the recent past); Elizabeth S. Scott, Miller v. Alabama and the (Past and) Future 
of Juvenile Crime Regulation, 31 LAW & INEQ. 535, 537–41 (2013) (arguing that this is a result of the 
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discussed the political and social dynamics that have led to overly broad 
transfer practices—a chronic series of moral panics about juvenile crime in 
general and juvenile violence in particular.11  These moral panics, however, 
have certain defining features that have not been sufficiently appreciated.  A 
fuller understanding of the nature of our anxieties about juveniles and the 
crimes they commit provides us with both a realistic sense of the limits of 
what reforms one might expect to attract political support, as well as a 
better sense of what types of reforms would assuage, rather than exacerbate, 
the anxieties that have created the second-best world of juvenile-crime 
politics within which we must function. 
Suffice it to say that, through a combination of practices, too many 
juveniles are being transferred to adult court.  Statutory exclusion and direct 
filing provisions result in the mandatory transfer of juveniles charged with 
certain types of offenses, regardless of the circumstances of the offense or 
offender.  In other jurisdictions, the creation of presumptions that transfer is 
appropriate in certain types of juvenile offenses produces the same result.  
Even in the absence of such practices, many judges are simply transferring 
too many juveniles after transfer hearings, many for offenses that are much 
less serious than the violent offenses that are the subject of the more 
mandatory mechanisms created by state legislatures.  The net result is that a 
large number of juveniles have simply been returned to the bad old days of 
the pre-juvenile court era, in which no meaningful distinction was made 
between adults and juveniles for the purposes of criminal liability. 
Understanding how we arrived at such transfer practices is essential to 
striking the optimal balance between realism and idealism in reforming 
them.  The indiscriminate transfer of juveniles to adult court developed in 
response to a series of moral panics about juvenile crimes that have been 
                                                                                                                 
1990s’ “moral panics”); Prateek Shukla, The Criminal Child and Its Potential for Change: A 
Presumption in Favor of Rehabilitation in Sentencing Juvenile Offenders, 38 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & 
CIV. CONFINEMENT 379, 382, 39–93 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing CLEMENS F. 
BARTOLLAS, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 185 (4th ed. 1997)) (arguing that fewer juveniles need to be 
sentenced as adults and that a presumption in favor of rehabilitating the juvenile offender would disrupt 
the juvenile’s “process of becoming deviant”); Benjamin Adams & Sean Addie, Delinquency Cases 
Waived to Criminal Court, 2009, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 1, 2 (2012), http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/239080. 
pdf (noting that the number of juveniles waived to criminal court “was greater in 2009 than in 1985 for 
person, drug, and public order offense cases”); Sarah Hockenberry, Person Offenses Cases in Juvenile 
Court, 2008, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 1, 2 (2011), http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/236480.pdf (showing that 
4,400 of the petitioned cases were judicially waived to criminal court); Crystal Knoll & Melissa 
Sickmund, Delinquency Cases in Juvenile Court, 2008, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 1, 3 (2011), http://www. 
ojjdp.gov/pubs/236479.pdf (showing that “[i]n 2008, juvenile court judges waived jurisdiction over an 
estimated 8,900 delinquency cases, sending them to criminal court”); Charles Puzzanchera et al., 
Juvenile Court Statistics 2009, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 1, 58 (2012), http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/239114.pdf 
(showing that 7,600 of all formally processed delinquency cases in 2009 were judicially transferred to 
criminal court).  But see, e.g., WILLIAM J. BENNETT, JOHN J. DIIULIO JR. & JOHN P. WALTERS, BODY 
COUNT: MORAL POVERTY . . . AND HOW TO WIN AMERICA’S WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS 11, 91 
(1996) (rebutting the “unthinking assertions about ‘too many’ [juveniles] behind bars” by arguing that 
“virtually all of those in prison . . . are . . . deserving enough . . . to merit secure confinement”). 
 11. See sources cited supra note 10. 
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widely discussed.12  Missing from that discussion, however, has been a 
clear understanding of how those moral panics influenced the crime politics 
of the era.  The juvenile crime panics of the 1980s and 1990s constituted a 
morality play of sorts that the public never seemed to tire of seeing 
reenacted.  This morality play involved three main characters: a monstrous 
offender, a neglected victim, and a soft-hearted judge. The monstrous 
offender was typically a sociopath who preyed upon innocent people 
without remorse.  The soft-hearted judge was the government official—
typically a judge, but sometimes a prosecutor or parole board—who was 
too caught up in sympathy for and understanding of the offender to 
recognize his obvious evil. The neglected victim was the blameless 
innocent who suffered at the hands of the monstrous offender who had been 
released by the soft-hearted judge.13 
The juvenile-offender moral panics of the 1980s and 1990s fit 
perfectly into this larger narrative about crime and punishment in 
contemporary American society.  Juvenile offenders during this time were 
seen as a “new breed”14 of remorseless “superpredators”15 who were not 
being held responsible for their crimes because judges—and sometimes 
prosecutors—were blinded to the juveniles’ obvious evil by the offenders’ 
tender age.  Those who argued on the basis of neuroscience or 
developmental psychology that juveniles should not be held fully 
responsible for their crimes were simply scientific versions of the soft-
hearted judges who were unable to recognize the obvious evil of this new 
breed of kids. 
Like any good story, the morality play about juvenile crime drew its 
appeal from powerful emotions experienced by its audience.  Two 
emotions, in particular, energized juvenile-justice punitivism: a fear of 
moral decline and a distrust of experts.  The reason judges, legislators, and 
prosecutors did not see the obvious evil of juvenile offenders was that they 
were too caught up in the moral relativism of the times.  Everyone had an 
excuse for everything because the rightness or wrongness of a particular 
                                                                                                                 
 12. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE xi–xiii (1998) (arguing that there is 
no greater protection from the creation of “general policies toward children and adolescents permeated 
with fear and hostility” than reason and perspective); see also Burrow, supra note 10, at 12–13 (noting 
Zimring’s “belief that judicial waiver decisions are arbitrary, capricious, and not guided by normative 
legal standards”). 
 13. See Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through Modern 
Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 831, 905–07 (2000) (arguing that the “unprecedented increase in the 
severity of criminal punishment in the United States” reflects anxiety about social cohesion); see also 
Joseph E. Kennedy, The Punitive Society (forthcoming) (on file with author). 
 14. See David S. Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin, “Owing to the Extreme Youth of the Accused”: 
The Changing Legal Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 641, 641 (2002); 
see also BENNETT ET AL., supra note 10, at 194. 
 15. The term “superpredator” was coined by John DiIlulio, who sounded the alarm about a coming 
wave of violent dangerous youths growing up in moral poverty.  BENNETT ET AL., supra note 10, at 28; 
John J. DiIlulio Jr., The Coming of the Super-Predators, WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 27, 1995, at 23. 
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choice was seen as relative to the circumstances of the offense and offender.  
The abuse of excuses flowed from and contributed to an overall decline in 
moral responsibility.  In the words of one bumper sticker, “[i]t’s not my 
fault that I never learned to accept responsibility.”16 
Experts were seen as complicit in this moral decline because they 
substituted specialized knowledge for the simpler common sense that was 
seen as necessary to tell right from wrong.  The unspoken assumption was 
that such experts came from a social and educational elite that had lost 
touch with the realities of crime.  Their intellectualized view of morality 
and character blinded them to the simpler and more widely shared truths 
about human behavior that emerge from a more common experience of 
people and society.  So far removed from the conditions under which crime 
occurs, they failed to see the ways in which diminished legal responsibility 
would make life unlivable in many communities.  They also failed to 
appreciate the emotive side of punishment—the ways in which punishment 
gives meaning to the suffering of crime victims and the ways in which 
diminished criminal responsibility would rob those victims of a collective 
moral meaning that they need to make sense of their sufferings.  Such 
experts are too blinded by theories about how someone might have behaved 
under more favorable circumstances to hold them accountable for how they 
did behave in the real world in which we all must live. 
These two emotions combined powerfully in debates about juvenile 
justice.  People who argued that juveniles should be punished less harshly 
on account of their tender age were bleeding hearts with soft heads and 
whose sentimental sympathies blinded them to the malevolence of the new 
breed.  Developmental psychologists who argued that the brain of the 
juvenile offender was materially—but not permanently—different from the 
adult brain, or criminologists who questioned the empirical premise of the 
“new breed” were point-headed intellectuals out of touch with what was 
happening on the streets. In such an emotional landscape, punitivism wins 
either way. 
The result of these rhetorical dynamics was what I have described 
elsewhere as “criminal justice fundamentalism.”  Because judgment cannot 
be trusted to be sufficiently punitive, inflexible policies are put in place.  At 
the enforcement level, zero tolerance polices mandate suspension or 
charging, regardless of context.  With respect to charging, statutory 
exclusion and direct filing provisions ensure that the decision to adjudicate 
the juvenile as an adult is made solely by the prosecutor.  Even in 
jurisdictions that require judges to decide whether transfer to adult court is 
appropriate, the list of charges that permit transfer was expanded.  The idea 
in each case is to combat moral relativism by sending a clear message that 
                                                                                                                 
 16. ZAZZLE, http://www.zazzle.com/its_not_my_fault_bumper_sticker-128535928762839729 (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2013) (emphasis omitted). 
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juveniles will be judged as adults and not relative to their age, and to entrust 
the decision to do so, either entirely, or as much as possible, to prosecutors. 
III.  PART III 
The emotional and rhetorical dynamics described have abated 
somewhat, but remain powerful and continue to constrain juvenile justice 
reform.  The simplest and most direct way to reduce transfers of juveniles 
to adult court would be to place categorical limits on what charges and 
circumstances could justify such a transfer and to abolish statutory 
exclusion and direct filing by prosecutors.  That would, in essence, seem to 
be fighting fire with fire: opposing categorical rules mandating or 
expanding adult court jurisdiction over juveniles with categorical rules 
restricting transfer.  It is particularly tempting to argue for such a 
categorical approach, given the growing expert consensus that juveniles are 
neurologically different from adults in significant and previously 
unappreciated ways and the general public’s growing interest in 
neuroscience.  Such an approach, while correct on the merits, would be a 
mistake. A categorical ban on transferring juveniles to adult court, for 
example, would fall in the wake of the next headline-grabbing case.  In the 
days leading up to this Symposium, a juvenile offender threatened a mother 
pushing a baby carriage that he would shoot her baby in the face if she did 
not comply with the juvenile offender’s demands during a robbery.17  When 
she failed to comply quickly enough, the juvenile shot and killed the baby.18  
Even if the offender in the above-mentioned case does not deserve to be 
judged for his terrible actions by adult standards because of neurological 
immaturity, such an argument would exacerbate, not mitigate, the punitive 
energies that have been distorting our thinking about juvenile justice for the 
last few decades.  Rather than fighting fire with fire, a flat rule banning 
transfer in such cases, justified on neuroscientific grounds, would be like 
pouring kerosene on a fire.  Such reforms get the balance between 
aspiration and inspiration wrong by ignoring the continuing rhetorical 
realities of the second-best world in which we live. 
Creating a jury trial right of last resort on the issue of transfer from 
juvenile court would better strike the balance between aspiration and 
inspiration that is necessary in our second-best world.  Juries would not 
necessarily be the best decision-makers on this issue, but they would be the 
most legitimate.  What better counterpoint to populist concerns about 
intellectual elites wrapped up in moral relativism than a jury drawn from 
the community?  To the degree that one looks at the very existence of 
                                                                                                                 
 17. Russ Bynum, Police Arrest 2 Teens in Georgia Baby’s Killing, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 22, 
2013, 8:27 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/police-ga-infant-killed-while-pushed-stroller-0. 
 18. Id. 
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juvenile courts as an exercise in the mitigation of punishment, such a jury 
right would have conceptual precedents.  Voluntary manslaughter doctrine 
mitigates liability for intentional killings by entrusting juries with the 
judgment of whether the defendant was in his right mind or caught up in the 
heat of passion at the time of the killing.19  To be sure, the judgment of the 
jury would not have to be an uninformed one.  Juries could consider 
evidence from developmental psychologists and neuroscientists in the same 
way that some juries consider expert testimony on the issue of battered 
spouse syndrome. 
My ambitions for such a reform are, concededly, modest.  It would 
probably not make things any better with respect to the most heinous crimes 
that arouse the public’s passions, but given the current state of affairs, it 
would not make things any worse, either.  The baby-face-shooter would 
probably be transferred in either regime, although the possibility exists that 
a jury might not transfer if the juvenile’s background provided some 
compelling explanation for such a terrible act.  The biggest impact of the 
jury trial right proposed would be in the mid- or low-level offenses that are 
currently being transferred.  More to the point, my proposal would have a 
chance of being adopted in that middle range of states where they are 
neither so liberal as to support more lenient measures, nor so punitive as to 
preclude any reform at all.  It is a second-best measure for our second-best 
world. 
A transfer jury trial right for juveniles might also serve as a stepping 
stone to a slightly better world, however.  A perplexing, but pragmatic, 
aspect of the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is the chicken-or-
egg quality of the role that emerging consensus plays.  As more states 
excluded juveniles from the death penalty, the practice became more cruel 
and unusual, until a tipping point was reached where the practice became 
unconstitutional.  The chicken-or-egg quality comes, of course, from the 
fact that the Court plays at least a modest role in the consensus that 
emerges.  The ban on executing the mentally retarded gave support to the 
argument against executing juveniles.  The consensus against executing 
juveniles and its subsequent judicial enshrinement in the Eighth 
Amendment stimulated a movement limiting the sentencing of juveniles to 
life without the possibility of parole.  The juvenile jury trial right proposed 
would certainly satisfy Miller’s requirement of an individualized process.  
More importantly, if enough states adopted it, a future court someday might 
recognize the sort of emerging consensus that would make punishing a 
juvenile as an adult in the absence of a jury cruel and unusual punishment.  
Arguably, such a requirement would draw support from the Court’s Sixth 
Amendment decisions recognizing jury trial rights with respect to offense 
elements that had been considered the province of the sentencing judge.  
                                                                                                                 
 19. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 446 (3d pocket ed. 2006). 
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Arguably, a right to a jury determination of the threshold issue of whether 
one is mature enough to be adjudicated as an adult is even more integral to 
one’s right to trial than the elements of the offense.  Such a prospect seems 
unlikely, perhaps, but it may not be more unlikely than the prospect ten 
years ago that the current Court would ban the execution of juveniles and 
limit the imposition of life without the possibility of parole. 
I have no illusions about how juries might exercise such a right.  But 
we live in a second-best world.  Creating a role for juries in transfer 
decisions might be a useful step in moving us towards a better one. 
